Part 2 of 4
The 39th Battalion (from the 30th Brigade)
began deploying over the Owen Stanley Range in June. It met
the brunt of the Japanese landing on 22 July and was driven
out of Kokoda on 9 August. Porter sought permission from the
Commander New Guinea Force, Major General Basil Morris,
to move into the mountains to command the force there, known
as Maroubra Force, but it was not until 12 August that he
left Port Moresby with the 53rd Battalion and his
headquarters staff. Arriving at Isurava on 18 August, he
began deploying his force - numbering about 600 personnel -
to meet an expected Japanese attack. He reported that the
supply situation was unsatisfactory.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Sydney
Rowell had arrived in Port Moresby to succeed Morris
as Commander New Guinea Force. Soon after, Major
General Arthur (Tubby) Allen, commander of the
experienced 7th Australian Division, had arrived with the
first elements of his division, namely the 21st Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier Arnold Potts. Rowell
gave Allen responsibility for operations in the Owen
Stanleys, and Allen promptly ordered Potts and his brigade
to recapture Kokoda. Once he arrived in the mountains Potts
would take command of Maroubra Force, which would then
consist of the 39th and 53rd Battalions and his own brigade.
Porter would return to Port Moresby, investigating logistic
arrangements on the way.
Potts, a Western Australian farmer, was just
short of his 46th birthday. Wounded in the First World War,
he had been a major in the Syrian campaign and had assumed
command of the 21st Brigade in April 1942. He was a brave
and inspiring soldier, who understood infantry fighting but
had little experience of higher level operations. He took
command of Maroubra Force at Isurava on 24 August, but only
one battalion of his brigade had arrived before the Japanese
began their major offensive on 26 August. In an intense
battle the brigade delayed the enemy for four days and
inflicted heavy casualties. Potts skilfully stepped his
battalions back, fighting successive rearguard actions as
they crossed the crest of the ranges. He had to keep
manoeuvring his battalions (the two militia battalions had
been withdrawn) to ensure that he always prevented the
Japanese from bypassing his force, in which case they could
have advanced unhindered towards Port Moresby.
On 8 September six Japanese battalions
attacked the remnants of his brigade south of Efogi. At one
stage the attackers were five metres from brigade
headquarters, with everyone from Potts to the headquarters
cooks involved in the action. He signalled Lieutenant
Colonel Albert Caro, commanding officer of the 2/16th
Battalion: "Tell Albert C. from Arnold P. If Arnold's bunch
is wiped, to take control and go to Number 12 [Menari]."
Afar repelling eight assaults Potts ordered another
withdrawal.
Angry with what he thought was Pott's
mishandling of his brigade, Rowell ordered Allen to relieve
Potts. Allen raised no objection as he felt that judging
from the signals, Potts "was either tired or was losing a
grip of the situation". Allen did, however, keep an open
mind over whether Potts had shown lack of judgement or had
been out-fought, and he persuaded Rowell to hear Potts's
story. Rowell reinstated Potts to the 21st Brigade when it
arrived back in the Port Moresby area. Potts had not failed
as a commander and had never lost heart; he retained the
confidence of his men throughout.
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