Part 3 of 4
On 10
September Porter relieved Potts south of Menari. With one of
its battalions separated in the withdrawal the 21st Brigade
now numbered 300 men, but was being reinforced by the 3rd
Battalion (militia). Under enemy pressure, Porter withdrew
to Ioribaiwa where he was joined by the first elements of
the AIF 25th Brigade. On 14 September Brigadier Ken
Eather, commander of the 25th Brigade, took over
from Porter. While Porter had commanded twice briefly on the
Kokoda Trail, his real contribution was the training of the
first two militia battalions that fought there.
Brigadier Eather (aged 41) was a militia officer who had
commanded the 2/1st Battalion in the first Libyan campaign
in 1941. Rowell had a "lot of faith in Eather", whose
battalions were fit, well-trained and experienced. But on 15
September Eather informed Allen that in the face of the
enemy's superior strength he had decided to withdraw to
Imita Ridge, about 40 kilometres by air from Port Moresby.
Allen ordered him to fight every inch of the way. In his
renowned book
Retreat from Kokoda, Raymond Paull records that
Allen said to Eather, "There won't be any withdrawal from
the Imita position, Ken. You'll die there if necessary. You
understand that?" In an interview in 1974, Eather could not
recall these words, although as he said, the telephone line
was "weak and spluttering". Rowell told Allen that further
withdrawal was out of the question and that "Eather must
fight it out at all costs".
In fact, the Japanese were at the end of their tether. Sent
forward with the minimum of supplies, for the first time
they were under Australian artillery fire. On 18 September,
following reverses in the Solomon Islands, the Japanese high
command ordered its force on the Kokoda Trail to withdraw to
the north coast.
Although the tide had now turned in favour of the
Australians, Eather's final withdrawal had far-reaching
consequences. General MacArthur had been unfairly
criticising the performance of the Australian soldiers in
the mountains. He now persuaded the Australian Prime
Minister, John Curtin, to order General Blamey to New
Guinea, where he was to take command. By the time Blamey
arrived on 23 September the position had stabilised. When on
28 September the 25th Brigade launched a major
counter-attack it found that the Japanese had abandoned
their position. But it was too late to save Rowell. On 29
September Blamey relieved him of command - more a result of
personal differences than because of any inadequacy in
Rowell's command.
On 3 October Blamey, MacArthur and Lieutenant General Edmund
Herring (who had replaced Rowell) travelled to Owers' Corner
at the beginning of the Kokoda Trail to watch the AIF 16th
Brigade begin its trek into the mountains following the 25th
Brigade as part of the Australian counter-offensive. With
them went the headquarters of the 7th Division. Major
General Allen, short, heavily built, aged 48, put a
pack on his back and headed into the mountains to command
the two brigades now being deployed forward.
A militia officer and accountant in civilian life, Allen had
commanded a platoon, company, and battalion in the First
World War. He had commanded the 16th Brigade in Libya and
Greece in early 1941 before taking over the 7th Division in
the Syrian campaign. Gavin Long described him thus: "Blunt
in speech, honest as the day, choleric yet kindly,
completely without affectation or pomposity, he was a leader
of a kind that appeals immediately to Australians."
Within days Allen began complaining that he did not have
sufficient supplies to deploy his forces fully. His leading
brigade, the 25th, was moving cautiously, on limited
supplies, meeting fierce Japanese defences in difficult
jungle terrain. Allen was determined to avoid unnecessary
casualties. Bypassing the chain of command - Herring was
nominally Allen's superior - Blamey asserted that the
supplies had been despatched and that Allen was to 'press
the enemy with vigour. If you are feeling strain personally
relief will be arranged." Allen was incensed and replied
that he "never felt fitter nor able to think straighter".
But MacArthur was pressing for a rapid advance, and Blamey
sent further orders urging Allen to move quickly.
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